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An algorithm for two-player repeated games with perfect monitoring
Dilip Abreu, Yuliy Sannikov
Economics
Research output
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Contribution to journal
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Article
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peer-review
15
Scopus citations
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Business & Economics
Repeated Games
100%
Monitoring
62%
Efficiency Gains
45%
Pure Strategies
25%
Randomization
25%
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
25%
Discounting
21%