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An algorithm for two-player repeated games with perfect monitoring
Dilip Abreu, Yuliy Sannikov
Economics
Research output
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Article
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peer-review
17
Scopus citations
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Keyphrases
Repeated Games
100%
Efficiency Gain
100%
Perfect Monitoring
100%
Payoff
50%
Two-player Games
50%
Equilibrium Payoffs
50%
Public Randomization
50%
Pure Strategy
50%
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
50%
Stage Game
50%
Payoff Set
50%
Mathematics
Repeated Game
100%
Extreme Points
100%
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
50%
Economics, Econometrics and Finance
Repeated Games
100%