‘Acting wife’: Marriage market incentives and labor market investments

Leonardo Bursztyn, Thomas Fujiwara, Amanda Pallais

Research output: Contribution to journalReview article

31 Scopus citations

Abstract

Do single women avoid career-enhancing actions because these actions signal undesirable traits, like ambition, to the marriage market? While married and unmarried female MBA students perform similarly when their performance is unobserved by classmates (on exams and problem sets), unmarried women have lower participation grades. In a field experiment, single female students reported lower desired salaries and willingness to travel and work long hours on a real-stakes placement questionnaire when they expected their classmates to see their preferences. Other groups’ responses were unaffected by peer observability. A second experiment indicates the effects are driven by observability by single male peers.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)3288-3319
Number of pages32
JournalAmerican Economic Review
Volume107
Issue number11
DOIs
StatePublished - Nov 2017

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics and Econometrics

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