Achievability of efficient satisfaction equilibria in self-configuring networks

François Mériaux, Samir Perlaza, Samson Lasaulce, Zhu Han, Vincent Poor

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

7 Scopus citations

Abstract

In this paper, a behavioral rule that allows radio devices to achieve an efficient satisfaction equilibrium (ESE) in fully decentralized self-configuring networks (DSCNs) is presented. The relevance of ESE in the context of DSCNs is that at such state, radio devices adopt a transmission/receive configuration such that they are able to simultaneously satisfy their individual quality-of-service (QoS) constraints. An ESE is also an efficient network configuration, i.e., individual QoS satisfaction is achieved by investing the lowest possible effort. Here, the notion of effort refers to a preference each radio device independently establishes among its own set of actions. In particular, the proposed behavioral rule requires less information than existing rules, as in the case of the classical best response dynamics and its variants. Sufficient conditions for convergence are presented in a general framework. Numerical results are provided in the context of a particular uplink power control scenario, and convergence from any initial action profile to an ESE is formally proved in this scenario. This property ensures the proposed rule to be robust to the dynamic arrival or departure of radio devices in the network.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationGame Theory for Networks - Third International ICST Conference, GameNets 2012, Revised Selected Papers
Pages1-15
Number of pages15
DOIs
StatePublished - 2012
Event3rd International ICST Conference on Game Theory for Networks, GameNets 2012 - Vancouver, BC, Canada
Duration: May 24 2012May 26 2012

Publication series

NameLecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering
Volume105 LNICST
ISSN (Print)1867-8211

Other

Other3rd International ICST Conference on Game Theory for Networks, GameNets 2012
CountryCanada
CityVancouver, BC
Period5/24/125/26/12

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Computer Networks and Communications

Keywords

  • Efficient Satisfaction Equilibrium
  • Games in Satisfaction Form
  • Power control
  • Supermodular games

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    Mériaux, F., Perlaza, S., Lasaulce, S., Han, Z., & Poor, V. (2012). Achievability of efficient satisfaction equilibria in self-configuring networks. In Game Theory for Networks - Third International ICST Conference, GameNets 2012, Revised Selected Papers (pp. 1-15). (Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering; Vol. 105 LNICST). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35582-0_1