Accidentally true belief and warrant

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2 Scopus citations


The Proper Functionist account of warrant - like many other externalist accounts - is vulnerable to certain Gettier-style counterexamples involving accidentally true beliefs. In this paper, I briefly survey the development of the account, noting the way it was altered in response to such counterexamples. I then argue that Alvin Plantinga's latest amendment to the account is flawed insofar as it rules out cases of true beliefs which do intuitively strike us as knowledge, and that a conjecture recently put forward by Thomas Crisp is also defective. I conclude by presenting my own suggestion as to how the account can be made less vulnerable to counterexamples involving accidentally true beliefs. Although I stay within the confines of Proper Functionism here, I think that my proposal (modulo a few details) could be attached to other externalist accounts of warrant as well.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)445-458
Number of pages14
Issue number3
StatePublished - 2003
Externally publishedYes

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Philosophy
  • General Social Sciences


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