A regression discontinuity test of strategic voting and duverger's law

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

57 Scopus citations

Abstract

This paper uses exogenous variation in electoral rules to test the predictions of strategic voting models and the causal validity of Duverger's Law. Exploiting a regression discontinuity design in the assignment of single-ballot and dual-ballot (runoff) plurality systems in Brazilian mayoral races, the results indicate that single-ballot plurality rule causes voters to desert third placed candidates and vote for the top two vote getters. The effects are stronger in close elections and cannot be explained by differences in the number of candidates, as well as their party affiliation and observable characteristics.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)197-233
Number of pages37
JournalQuarterly Journal of Political Science
Volume6
Issue number3-4
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 1 2011

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Sociology and Political Science
  • Political Science and International Relations

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'A regression discontinuity test of strategic voting and duverger's law'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

  • Cite this