A Prospect Theoretic Extension of a Non-Zero-Sum Stochastic Eavesdropping and Jamming Game

Andrey Garnaev; Wade Trappe; Narayan B. Mandayam; H. Vincent Poor

doi:10.1109/WIFS49906.2020.9360898

A Prospect Theoretic Extension of a Non-Zero-Sum Stochastic Eavesdropping and Jamming Game

Andrey Garnaev, Wade Trappe, Narayan B. Mandayam, H. Vincent Poor

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

Abstract

Wireless networks are susceptible to malicious attacks, especially those involving jamming and eavesdropping. In this paper, we consider a sophisticated adversary with the dual capability of either eavesdropping passively or jamming any ongoing transmission. We investigate a new aspect to consider when designing an anti-adversary strategy to maintain secure and reliable communication: how subjective behavior can impact multi-time slotted communication in the presence of such a sophisticated adversary. To model this scenario we develop a Prospect Theory (PT) extension of a non-zero-sum stochastic game, and derive its PT-equilibrium in closed form for any probability weighting functions. Uniqueness of the PT-equilibrium is proven. Our theoretical results, also supported by simulations, suggest that the anti-adversary strategy is more sensitive to varying network parameters and subjective factors when compared to the adversary's strategy.

Original language	English (US)
Title of host publication	2020 IEEE International Workshop on Information Forensics and Security, WIFS 2020
Publisher	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
ISBN (Electronic)	9781728199306
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1109/WIFS49906.2020.9360898
State	Published - Dec 6 2020
Event	2020 IEEE International Workshop on Information Forensics and Security, WIFS 2020 - New York, United States Duration: Dec 6 2020 → Dec 11 2020

Publication series

Name	2020 IEEE International Workshop on Information Forensics and Security, WIFS 2020

Conference

Conference	2020 IEEE International Workshop on Information Forensics and Security, WIFS 2020
Country/Territory	United States
City	New York
Period	12/6/20 → 12/11/20

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Computer Networks and Communications
Signal Processing
Information Systems and Management
Safety, Risk, Reliability and Quality

Keywords

Eavesdropping
Jamming
Prospect Theory
Stochastic Game

Access to Document

10.1109/WIFS49906.2020.9360898

Cite this

Garnaev, A., Trappe, W., Mandayam, N. B., & Poor, H. V. (2020). A Prospect Theoretic Extension of a Non-Zero-Sum Stochastic Eavesdropping and Jamming Game. In 2020 IEEE International Workshop on Information Forensics and Security, WIFS 2020 [9360898] (2020 IEEE International Workshop on Information Forensics and Security, WIFS 2020). Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.. https://doi.org/10.1109/WIFS49906.2020.9360898

Garnaev, Andrey ; Trappe, Wade ; Mandayam, Narayan B. et al. / A Prospect Theoretic Extension of a Non-Zero-Sum Stochastic Eavesdropping and Jamming Game. 2020 IEEE International Workshop on Information Forensics and Security, WIFS 2020. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2020. (2020 IEEE International Workshop on Information Forensics and Security, WIFS 2020).

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title = "A Prospect Theoretic Extension of a Non-Zero-Sum Stochastic Eavesdropping and Jamming Game",

abstract = "Wireless networks are susceptible to malicious attacks, especially those involving jamming and eavesdropping. In this paper, we consider a sophisticated adversary with the dual capability of either eavesdropping passively or jamming any ongoing transmission. We investigate a new aspect to consider when designing an anti-adversary strategy to maintain secure and reliable communication: how subjective behavior can impact multi-time slotted communication in the presence of such a sophisticated adversary. To model this scenario we develop a Prospect Theory (PT) extension of a non-zero-sum stochastic game, and derive its PT-equilibrium in closed form for any probability weighting functions. Uniqueness of the PT-equilibrium is proven. Our theoretical results, also supported by simulations, suggest that the anti-adversary strategy is more sensitive to varying network parameters and subjective factors when compared to the adversary's strategy.",

keywords = "Eavesdropping, Jamming, Prospect Theory, Stochastic Game",

author = "Andrey Garnaev and Wade Trappe and Mandayam, {Narayan B.} and Poor, {H. Vincent}",

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Garnaev, A, Trappe, W, Mandayam, NB & Poor, HV 2020, A Prospect Theoretic Extension of a Non-Zero-Sum Stochastic Eavesdropping and Jamming Game. in 2020 IEEE International Workshop on Information Forensics and Security, WIFS 2020., 9360898, 2020 IEEE International Workshop on Information Forensics and Security, WIFS 2020, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2020 IEEE International Workshop on Information Forensics and Security, WIFS 2020, New York, United States, 12/6/20. https://doi.org/10.1109/WIFS49906.2020.9360898

A Prospect Theoretic Extension of a Non-Zero-Sum Stochastic Eavesdropping and Jamming Game. / Garnaev, Andrey; Trappe, Wade; Mandayam, Narayan B. et al.

2020 IEEE International Workshop on Information Forensics and Security, WIFS 2020. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2020. 9360898 (2020 IEEE International Workshop on Information Forensics and Security, WIFS 2020).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

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N2 - Wireless networks are susceptible to malicious attacks, especially those involving jamming and eavesdropping. In this paper, we consider a sophisticated adversary with the dual capability of either eavesdropping passively or jamming any ongoing transmission. We investigate a new aspect to consider when designing an anti-adversary strategy to maintain secure and reliable communication: how subjective behavior can impact multi-time slotted communication in the presence of such a sophisticated adversary. To model this scenario we develop a Prospect Theory (PT) extension of a non-zero-sum stochastic game, and derive its PT-equilibrium in closed form for any probability weighting functions. Uniqueness of the PT-equilibrium is proven. Our theoretical results, also supported by simulations, suggest that the anti-adversary strategy is more sensitive to varying network parameters and subjective factors when compared to the adversary's strategy.

AB - Wireless networks are susceptible to malicious attacks, especially those involving jamming and eavesdropping. In this paper, we consider a sophisticated adversary with the dual capability of either eavesdropping passively or jamming any ongoing transmission. We investigate a new aspect to consider when designing an anti-adversary strategy to maintain secure and reliable communication: how subjective behavior can impact multi-time slotted communication in the presence of such a sophisticated adversary. To model this scenario we develop a Prospect Theory (PT) extension of a non-zero-sum stochastic game, and derive its PT-equilibrium in closed form for any probability weighting functions. Uniqueness of the PT-equilibrium is proven. Our theoretical results, also supported by simulations, suggest that the anti-adversary strategy is more sensitive to varying network parameters and subjective factors when compared to the adversary's strategy.

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Garnaev A, Trappe W, Mandayam NB, Poor HV. A Prospect Theoretic Extension of a Non-Zero-Sum Stochastic Eavesdropping and Jamming Game. In 2020 IEEE International Workshop on Information Forensics and Security, WIFS 2020. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc. 2020. 9360898. (2020 IEEE International Workshop on Information Forensics and Security, WIFS 2020). doi: 10.1109/WIFS49906.2020.9360898

A Prospect Theoretic Extension of a Non-Zero-Sum Stochastic Eavesdropping and Jamming Game

Abstract

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All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Keywords

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