A polynomial-time method to find the sparsest unobservable attacks in power networks

Yue Zhao, Andrea Goldsmith, H. Vincent Poor

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

1 Scopus citations

Abstract

Power injection attacks that alter generation and loads at buses in power networks are studied. The system operator employs Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs) to detect such physical attacks, while attackers devise attacks that are unobservable by such PMU networks. Unalterable buses, whose power injections cannot be changed, are also considered in our model. It is shown that, given the PMU locations, the minimum sparsity of unobservable attacks has a simple form with probability one, namely, equation, where equation is defined as the vulnerable vertex connectivity of an augmented graph. The constructive proof allows one to find the entire set of the sparsest unobservable attacks in polynomial time.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publication2016 American Control Conference, ACC 2016
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Pages276-282
Number of pages7
Volume2016-July
ISBN (Electronic)9781467386821
DOIs
StatePublished - Jul 28 2016
Event2016 American Control Conference, ACC 2016 - Boston, United States
Duration: Jul 6 2016Jul 8 2016

Other

Other2016 American Control Conference, ACC 2016
CountryUnited States
CityBoston
Period7/6/167/8/16

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering

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    Zhao, Y., Goldsmith, A., & Poor, H. V. (2016). A polynomial-time method to find the sparsest unobservable attacks in power networks. In 2016 American Control Conference, ACC 2016 (Vol. 2016-July, pp. 276-282). [7524928] Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.. https://doi.org/10.1109/ACC.2016.7524928