A note on superadditive probability judgment

Laura Macchi, Daniel Osherson, David H. Krantz

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

53 Scopus citations


Recent studies have demonstrated subadditivity of human probability judgment: The judged probabilities for an event partition sum to more than 1. We report conditions under which people's probability judgments are superadditive instead: The component judgments for a partition sum to less than 1. Both directions of deviation from additivity are interpreted in a common framework, in which probability judgments are often mediated by judgments of evidence. The 2 kinds of nonadditivity result from differences in recruitment of supporting evidence together with reduced processing of nonfocal propositions.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)210-214
Number of pages5
JournalPsychological Review
Issue number1
StatePublished - Jan 1999

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • General Psychology


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