TY - GEN
T1 - A noncooperative game for double auction-based energy trading between PHEVs and distribution grids
AU - Saad, Walid
AU - Han, Zhu
AU - Poor, H. Vincent
AU - Başar, Tamer
N1 - Copyright:
Copyright 2012 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.
PY - 2011
Y1 - 2011
N2 - Plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs) will constitute a key element in the emerging smart grid system. In this paper, the complex decision making processes of a number of PHEV groups seeking to sell part of their stored energy in a power market are studied using noncooperative games and double auctions. In particular, a noncooperative game is formulated between the PHEV groups. In this game, each PHEV group can make a decision on the maximum amount of energy surplus that it is willing to sell so as to maximize a utility function that captures the tradeoff between the economical benefits from energy trading and the associated costs. The trading price governing the energy exchange market between the PHEVs and the smart grid network is determined using a strategy-proof double auction. For solving the game, an algorithm based on best response dynamics is proposed using which the PHEV groups can reach a Nash equilibrium point. Simulation results show how our approach allows the PHEV groups to act strategically while improving the average utility achieved per PHEV group of up to 100.2% relative to a greedy algorithm.
AB - Plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs) will constitute a key element in the emerging smart grid system. In this paper, the complex decision making processes of a number of PHEV groups seeking to sell part of their stored energy in a power market are studied using noncooperative games and double auctions. In particular, a noncooperative game is formulated between the PHEV groups. In this game, each PHEV group can make a decision on the maximum amount of energy surplus that it is willing to sell so as to maximize a utility function that captures the tradeoff between the economical benefits from energy trading and the associated costs. The trading price governing the energy exchange market between the PHEVs and the smart grid network is determined using a strategy-proof double auction. For solving the game, an algorithm based on best response dynamics is proposed using which the PHEV groups can reach a Nash equilibrium point. Simulation results show how our approach allows the PHEV groups to act strategically while improving the average utility achieved per PHEV group of up to 100.2% relative to a greedy algorithm.
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U2 - 10.1109/SmartGridComm.2011.6102331
DO - 10.1109/SmartGridComm.2011.6102331
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:84855850793
SN - 9781457717024
T3 - 2011 IEEE International Conference on Smart Grid Communications, SmartGridComm 2011
SP - 267
EP - 272
BT - 2011 IEEE International Conference on Smart Grid Communications, SmartGridComm 2011
T2 - 2011 IEEE 2nd International Conference on Smart Grid Communications, SmartGridComm 2011
Y2 - 17 October 2011 through 20 October 2011
ER -