A non-cooperative power control game for multi-carrier CDMA systems

Farhad Meshkati, Mung Chiang, Stuart C. Schwartz, H. Vincent Poor, Narayan B. Mandayam

Research output: Contribution to journalConference article

18 Scopus citations

Abstract

In this work, a non-cooperative power control game for multi-carrier CDMA systems is proposed. In the proposed game, each user needs to decide how much power to transmit over each carrier to maximize its overall utility. The utility function considered here measures the number of reliable bits transmitted per joule of energy consumed. It is shown that the user's utility is maximized when the user transmits only on the carrier with the best "effective channel". The existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium for the proposed game are investigated and the properties of equilibrium are studied. Also, an iterative and distributed algorithm for reaching the equilibrium (if it exists) is presented. It is shown that the proposed approach results in a significant improvement in the total utility achieved at equilibrium compared to the case in which each user maximizes its utility over each carrier independently.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)606-611
Number of pages6
JournalIEEE Wireless Communications and Networking Conference, WCNC
Volume1
StatePublished - Sep 26 2005
Event2005 IEEE Wireless Communications and Networking Conference, WCNC 2005: Broadband Wirelss for the Masses - Ready for Take-off - New Orleans, LA, United States
Duration: Mar 13 2005Mar 17 2005

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Engineering(all)

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