Abstract
How should we account for the extraordinary regularity in the world? Humeans and Non-Humeans sharply disagree. According to Non-Humeans, the world behaves in an extraordinarily regular way because of certain necessary connections in nature. However, Humeans have thought that Non-Humean views are metaphysically objectionable. In particular, there are two general metaphysical principles that Humeans have found attractive that are incompatible with all existing versions of Non-Humeanism. My goal in this paper is to develop a novel version of Non-Humeanism that is consistent with (and even entails) both of these general metaphysical principles. By endorsing such a view, one can have the explanatory benefits of Non-Humeanism while at the same time avoiding two of the major metaphysical objections towards Non-Humeanism.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 1031-1048 |
Number of pages | 18 |
Journal | Philosophical Studies |
Volume | 180 |
Issue number | 3 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Mar 2023 |
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Philosophy
Keywords
- Laws of nature
- Modality
- Monism
- Persistence
- Powers