A dynamic theory of resource wars

Daron Acemoglu, Mikhail Golosov, Aleh Tsyvinski, Pierre Yared

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

27 Scopus citations

Abstract

We develop a dynamic theory of resource wars and study the conditions under which such wars can be prevented. Our focus is on the interaction between the scarcity of resources and the incentives for war in the presence of limited commitment. We show that a key parameter determining the incentives for war is the elasticity of demand. Our first result identifies a novel externality that can precipitate war: price-taking firms fail to internalize the impact of their extraction on military action. In the case of inelastic resource demand, war incentives increase over time and war may become inevitable. Our second result shows that in some situations, regulation of prices and quantities by the resource-rich country can prevent war, and when this is the case, there will also be slower resource extraction than the Hotelling benchmark (with inelastic demand). Our third result is that because of limited commitment and its implications for armament incentives, regulation of prices and quantities might actually precipitate war even in some circumstances where wars would not have arisen under competitive markets.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)283-331
Number of pages49
JournalQuarterly Journal of Economics
Volume127
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - 2012

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics and Econometrics

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    Acemoglu, D., Golosov, M., Tsyvinski, A., & Yared, P. (2012). A dynamic theory of resource wars. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 127(1), 283-331. https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjr048