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A Dynamic Reinterpretation of Nash Bargaining With Endogenous Threats
Dilip Abreu, David Pearce
Economics
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Article
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peer-review
14
Scopus citations
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Dive into the research topics of 'A Dynamic Reinterpretation of Nash Bargaining With Endogenous Threats'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.
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Business & Economics
Equilibrium Selection
100%
Nash Bargaining
98%
Infinite-Horizon Game
63%
Threat
56%
Stochastic Games
50%
Two-stage Game
49%
Repeated Games
44%
Enforcement
34%