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A case for the judicial enforcement of principles

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Abstract

Around the world, autocrats use law to undermine constitutionalism, subordinating judiciaries while maintaining a facade of legality. Judicial independence—vital to constitutional governance—is challenging to define, often balancing institutional autonomy with adherence to legal norms. When laws threaten judicial independence, judges must resort to higher principles embedded in constitutions and transnational commitments to assess these laws critically. This chapter argues that judicial independence requires refusing to enforce laws designed to curtail it. Judges, bound by principles rather than merely statutes, must ensure coherence within the legal order by relying on higher norms. Such principles, drawn from constitutions, treaties, or established human rights frameworks, provide a counterweight to political overreach. In autocratic times, courts must not passively follow laws that compromise democratic values but instead protect constitutional integrity. True judicial independence is achieved through principled resistance to authoritarian encroachments while remaining within the broader legal framework.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationSustaining the Rule of Law
Subtitle of host publicationThe Future of Judicial Independence in Europe
PublisherEdward Elgar Publishing Ltd.
Pages36-56
Number of pages21
ISBN (Electronic)9781035345472
ISBN (Print)9781035345465
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2025
Externally publishedYes

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • General Social Sciences

Keywords

  • Autocratic capture
  • Constitutionalism
  • Judicial enforcement
  • Judicial independence
  • Legal principles
  • Rule of law

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